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INTERTEMPORAL EVALUATION CRITERIA
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The evaluation of long-term effects of climate change in cost-benefit analy-
sis has a long tradition in environmental economics. Since the publication of
the Stern Review in 2006 the debate about the "appropriate" discounting of future
welfare and utility levels was revived and the most renowned scholars of the pro-
fession participated in this debate. But it seems that some contributions dealing
with the Stern Review and the Review itself mixed up normative and positive is-
sues to defend the own position. Furthermore, as we argue in this contribution, it
also seems that the debate misses the heart of the problem. The aim of this work
is to bring together economic and philosophical reasoning about justice and in-
tergenerational equity in the context of climate change. So we adopt the normative
view in order to present the most important ethical issues that, particularly in the
context of climate policy, are most relevant for the choice of intertemporal welfare
criteria. We investigate the properties of the Maximin, the Undiscounted Utilitar-
ianism, Discounted Utilitarianism and more recently developed hybrid criteria.
Subsequently we explore whether ethical considerations may also be helpful to
determine the parameter values which, after the choice of some type of intertem-
poral social welfare function, are needed to specify the concrete criterion that is
employed to make decisions on climate policy. Namely we try to delimit the
range for the inequality aversion parameter (휂) and for the pure rate of time pref-
erence (휌).
Our findings are, at least from an ethical point of view, rather pessimistic.
Following Max Weber’s famous "Wertfreiheitspostulat" it can never be decided
objectively and on a scientific base what should be considered as an equitable dis-
tribution e.g. among generations. Nevertheless, our considerations allow some
tentative conclusions. First, the decision between undiscounted and discounted
utilitarianism turning down the undiscounted version as often postulated in the
literature neither seems to be appropriate nor necessary. To endorse equal treat-
ment of generations and thus undiscounted utilitarianism at the fundamental
level does, moreover, not preclude that some, possibly extremely small pure time
discount rate is applied through which the uncertainty of future costs and bene-
fits is taken into account. And second, as a consequence, the decisive parameter
in intertemporal decisions is the 휂. We agree with Stern’s argumentation for an
extremely small pure rate of time preference, but we fundamentally disagree with
his low choice of 휂 of 1. We recommend values of 휂 that are closer to 2 than to
1. The question of principle whether to use undiscounted or discounted utilitar-
ianism is to some degree futile concerning practical policy implications. What in
the end matters much more is the selection of specific parameter values for which
some well-founded ethical judgment, however, is often hard to provide.
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DAS WICHTIGSTE IN KÜRZE
Die Bewertung der langfristigen Auswirkungen des Klimawandels im Rah-
men von Kosten-Nutzen Analysen hat eine lange Tradtion in der Ökonomie.
Mit der Veröffentlichung des Stern Reports im Jahr 2006 wurde die Debatte um
die "angemessene" Diskontrate von zukünftigen Wohlfahrts- und Nutzenniveaus
wiederbelebt und die angesehensten Ökonomen haben zu dieser Debatte beige-
tragen. Aber es hat den Anschein, dass die Publikationen zum Stern Report und
der Report selbst normative und positive Themen vermischt haben, um die eigene
Position zu verteidigen. Wie wir in diesem Papier argumentieren geht die De-
batte am Kern vorbei. Das Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, ökonomisches und philosophis-
ches Denken zu Themen der Gerechtigkeit zwischen den Generationen im Zusam-
menhang mit dem Klimawandel zu vereinen. Wir nehmen daher die norma-
tive Perspektive ein und präsentieren die wichtigsten ethischen Probleme, die
für die Auswahl eines intertemporalen Wohlfahrtskriteriums entscheidend sind.
Wir untersuchen die Eigenschaften des Maximin-Kriteriums, des undiskontierten
Utilitarismus, des diskontierten Utilitarismus und neueren, hybriden Kriterien.
Daraufhin untersuchen wir, ob ethische Überlegungen hilfreich seien können,
um Paramterwerte zu bestimmen, welche für die jeweiligen Wohlfahrskriterien
entscheidend sind. Wir wollen eine plausible Bandbreite für die zentralen Vari-
ablen geben, dem Parameter zur Ungleichheitsaversion (휂) und der Rate der
reinen Zeitpräferenz (휌).
Unsere Resultate sind, zumindest aus ethischer Sichtweise, eher pessimistisch.
Beachtet man Max Weber’s "Wertfreiheitspostulat", kann niemals objektiv und
auf wissenschaftlicher Basis festgelegt werden, was eine gerechte Verteilung, z.B.
zwischen den Generationen, ist. Trotzdem können wir einige vorsichtige Schluß-
folgerungen ziehen. Die Wahl zwischen undiskontiertem und diskontiertem Util-
itartismus scheint, anders als die geläufige Literatur behauptet, irrelevant zu sein.
Um, wie es der undiskontierte Utilitarismus tut, eine Gleichbehandlung der Gen-
erationen zu gewährleisten, kann eine marginal positive reine Zeitpräferenzrate
verwendet werden, die die Unsicherheit zukünftiger Kosten und Nutzen berück-
sichtigt. Zweitens, als Folge davon, ist der entscheidende Paramter das 휂. Wir
stimmen dahingehend mit Stern’s Argumentation für eine marginal positive Zeit-
präferenzrate überein, aber wir wiedersprechen vehement seiner sehr niedrig
gewählten Wahl von 휂 = 1. Wir empfehlen Werte von 휂 die näher an 2 sind
als an 1. In der Praxis ist die Wahl zwischen undiskontierten und diskontierten
Wohlfahrtsfunktionen bis zu einem gewissen Grad unerheblich. Was vielmehr
wichtig ist, ist die genau begründete Wahl der entscheidenden Parameter, was
aus dem ethischen Blickwinkel, oftmals sehr schwierig ist.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The results of cost benefit analysis crucially depend on the welfare criteria that
are used to evaluate the streams of well-being over time that are generated by the
investment projects under consideration. In economics and philosophy there is
a long lasting and rather controversial debate as to which type of intertemporal
social welfare function and, in particular, which social discount rate should be
applied. This debate has been revitalized in the last few years because, especially
since the release of the Stern Review in 2006, it has become clear which effect the
choice of the social discount rate has on the design of climate policy. An impor-
tant question in this context is in which way and to which degree the interests
of future generations should be taken into account when decisions with long-run
consequences are made. From this perspective the decision to apply a specific in-
tertemporal evaluation criterion becomes a matter of ethics, i.e. of justice between
generations.
There exist two opposing "schools" in economics which have completely dif-
ferent positions concerning the importance of intergenerational ethics for intertem-
poral evaluation (see Aldy et al. (2010), p.912). On the one hand there is the
positive ("descriptive") school for which ethical judgment is redundant since em-
pirically observable market interest rates should be the benchmark for the deter-
mination of the social discount. On the other hand there is the normative ("pre-
scriptive") school which has its roots in classical welfare economics and for which
explicitly formulated normative criteria are of much importance. For this school
an ethically oriented debate on the properties and implications of different in-
tertemporal evaluation criteria and their basic norms is essential.
In this paper we will adopt the perspective of the normative school (see also
Roemer J. (2011), for an excellent defense of the ethical position). Our main ob-
jective then is to present the most important ethical issues that, particularly in the
context of climate policy, are most relevant for the choice of intertemporal wel-
fare criteria. We will proceed as follows. In Section 2 we present various classes of
intertemporal social welfare functions well-known from optimal growth theory
(i.e. maximin, undiscounted utilitarianism, discounted utilitarianism and some
recently developed hybrid criteria) and discuss which desirable and undesirable
properties can be attributed to them. In Section 3 we explore whether ethical con-
siderations may also be helpful to determine the parameter values (or at least to
delimit their range) which, after the choice of some type of intertemporal social
welfare function, are needed to specify the concrete criterion that is employed to
make decisions on climate policy. In Section 4 we summarize and conclude.
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II. ETHICALLY RELEVANT PROPERTIES OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF
INTERTEMPORAL SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTIONS
A. Preliminaries
As common in the literature we assume that 푐푡 denotes well-being in each
period 푡 = 1, 2, . . . . This means that the vector of various determinants of well-
being, i.e. material consumption, leisure, environmental quality etc, is mapped
into the real-valued indicator 푐푡. The severe problems of measurement and ag-
gregation of 푐푡 are not treated in this paper1. It is only for terminological conve-
nience, that in the following the variable 푐푡 will be identified with consumption in
period 푡 . Time is discrete, with each period of time 푡 = 1, 2, . . . representing just
the lifespan of one single generation. So generations do not overlap, and for the
sake of simplification, we suppose that population is constant over time thus ne-
glecting the ethical aspects of population change2. If some technology and some
initial resource endowment are given there is a class Γ of feasible consumption
paths (푐1, 푐2, . . . ) of infinite length. These consumption paths are evaluated by
an intertemporal social welfare function 푊 (.) which is weakly monotone in all
variables and may assume values in the interval [−∞,+∞].
B. Maximin
This criterion dates back to Rawls´ "difference principle" (although Rawls, J.
(1971) himself did neither accept the denomination maximin nor the application
of this criterion in the intergenerational context). It was Solow, R. (1974) - as
an attempt to be "plus Rawlsien que le Rawls" - who applied this criterion to
the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow growth model, in which the input of an exhaustible
resource is continually substituted by reproducible man-made capital. Given an
infinite number of generations the minimum level of consumption along a given
consumption path may not exist. Therefore, the maximin social welfare function
must in this case be defined as
푊 (푐1, 푐2, . . . ) = inf
푡=1,2,...
푐푡 (1)
This social welfare function satisfies two commonly shared ethical objectives that
play a major role in the intergenerational context.
1d‘Aspremont, C. and Gevers, L. (1977) offer a very comprehensive axiomatic approach to-
wards different social welfare functional. Roemer, J. (1996) summarizes the extensive literature
and contributions that deal with the measurability of well-being and its relevance for social wel-
fare functional in a very elegant manner.
2We refer the reader who is interested in situations with a changing population to Blackorby,
C. , Bossert, W. and Donaldson, D. (1995).
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(i) All generations have an equal weight in social evaluation, such that in partic-
ular future generations are not discriminated simply because they have the bad
luck to appear later on the time axis. This intergenerational neutrality also means
that the value of the social welfare function (1) is not changed even if an infinite
permutation of a given consumption path is made. For a long time (see already
Sidgwick, H. (1874)), equal treatment of generations has been considered to be
the basic requirement for intergenerational fairness. Maximin also respects some
albeit rather weak version of the Pareto principle: If consumption does not de-
crease for any generation the new path obviously is not worse than the original
one according to (1).
(ii) The maximin rule (1) implements quite specific non-decreasing and thus sus-
tainable paths as optimal solutions when these are technically feasible: Assume
that there exists a strictly positive consumption level 푐 that, for the given technol-
ogy and the given initial resource endowment can be attained by any generation.
Then it is clearly excluded by application of (1) that some later generation´s con-
sumption falls below 푐 and some earlier generation enjoys consumption above
푐. If such a constant consumption path (푐, 푐 is Pareto optimal it maximizes social
welfare according to (1) among all feasible paths. This was the situation consid-
ered in Solow, R. (1974) classical paper for the special case of a Dasgupta-Heal-
Solow economy.
Even though the maximin rule shows these ethically appealing properties it
also has some serious disadvantages such that it generally only serves as some
benchmark criterion which is not considered to be an appropriate instrument for
intertemporal evaluation. But this standard view may be questioned if the econ-
omy’s state of development is already very high and maximin does not apply to
levels of material consumption but to basic and partly non-substitutable goods as
staple food or health (see Roemer J. (2011)).
(i) It does not respect more demanding versions of the Pareto criterion , i.e. val-
uation according to (1) is completely insensitive to increases in consumption as
long as the minimum/infimum of consumption does not change. In particular,
the strong Pareto principle is violated, which means that any increase of con-
sumption along a given path should give a new path that is strictly preferred to
the original one. To give an example just consider the two consumption paths(
1
2
, 1
3
, 1
4
, . . .
)
and
(
1, 2
3
, 1
2
, . . .
)
. Both have the same infimum equal to zero but in
each period the second path has a higher level of consumption than the first one.
In the case of a finite number of generation this problem can easily be solved by
adopting the leximin criterion, but with an infinite number of generations such an
extension is neither straightforward nor does it allow a comparison of all paths.
(ii) The maximin criterion forbids any investment of an earlier generation to in-
crease the level of well-being of future generations above the level enjoyed by
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itself - irrespective of the extent of that increase and the number of future gener-
ations which would benefit. To give an example we start from the constant con-
sumption path (1, 1, 1, . . . ) and assume that the economy under consideration is
so productive that the path ( 999
1000
, 2, 2, . . . is also technically feasible. I.e. if one sin-
gle generation (the first one) makes a sacrifice of only 1
1000
units of consumption
each subsequent generation could double its level of well-being. Nevertheless,
the maximin rule deems this path as inferior to the constant consumption path.
Strict application of maximin thus condemns the economy to stagnation and pre-
cludes economic growth which in the standard way is based on investment. It
was this reason why Rawls, J. (1971) did not recommend the difference principle
to make choices in the intergenerational context.
C. Undiscounted Utilitarianism
In his seminal paper on optimal growth theory Ramsey, F. (1928) used undis-
counted utilitarianism to evaluate and compare feasible consumption paths. This
class of criteria shares some advantages and disadvantages with the maximin
rule but has merits and shortcomings of its own. The standard version of an
undiscounted utilitarian social welfare functions reads as
푊 (푐1, 푐2, . . . ) =
∞∑
푡=1
푢(푐푡) (2)
where 푢(푐) - usually defined for all consumption levels 푐 > 0 - is a strictly mono-
tone increasing utility function through which the well-being of each generation
is assessed before it enters social evaluation. Often an isoelastic utility func-
tion given by 푢(푐) = 푐
1−휂
1−휂 is employed where the elasticity of marginal utility
휂 ≥ 1 (with 휂 ∕= 1) indicates the degree of inequality aversion in social evalu-
ation. For 휂 = 1 the utility function is defined as ln 푐 (which is justified since
lim휂→1 = 푐
1−휂
1−휂 = ln 푐, ∀ 푐 > 0). The main ethical advantages of undiscounted
utilitarianism are as follows:
(i) Just as the maximin rule application of an undiscounted utilitarian social wel-
fare function according to (2) implies equal treatment of all generations and thus
respects the fundamental postulate for intergenerational justice. Welfare is not
changed when the consumption levels of a finite number of generations are per-
muted if, as assumed in (2), the utility function 푢(푐) is the same for all periods.
Note, however, that this property is not an implication of the undiscounted util-
itarian approach as such but anonymity as a separate assumption. Concerning
distribution in the atemporal setting, i.e. within a society in a certain period of
time, it is moreover quite common in welfare economics to make judgments with
unweighted sums of utility.
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(ii) Undiscounted utilitarianism ensures sustainable development if the economy
under consideration is productive in an intuitive sense: If some generation makes
a consumption sacrifice thus expanding the capital stock then it will be possible
for any later generation to increase its consumption by more than this earlier sac-
rifice. Then it follows from a general argument (see Asheim, G., Buchholz, W.
and Tungodden, B. (2001)) that a non-decreasing consumption will never max-
imize the objective function (2). So it is ensured that only non-decreasing paths
are selected by applying an undiscounted utilitarian criterion. Along such paths
no generation consumes more than it concedes to its successors.
(iii) If the utility function 푢(푐) is concave what is usually assumed then a rank-
preserving Pigou-Dalton transfer from a rich generation with high consumption
to a poorer generation with lower consumption increases aggregate welfare (2)
(see in a general welfare theoretic framework Atkinson, A. (1970)). Thus undis-
counted utilitarianism is also useful to take equality of the distribution of well-
being among generations into account which, as an ethical objective, is conceptu-
ally different from the equal treatment of all generations in the welfare function.
Adopting utility functions 푢(푐) with more or less curvature, i.e. varying the pa-
rameter 휂 in the case of an isoelastic utility function, makes it possible to capture
different degrees of inequality aversion in social evaluation. Seen from this per-
spective the maximin criterion is the extreme case where inequality aversion 휂
is infinite. Classical utilitarianism, where 푢(푐) = 푐 and the pure consumption
levels are summed up in (2), reflects the extreme in which inequality aversion is
completely absent.
On the other hand undiscounted utilitarianism has some properties which are
less desirable.
(i) Given a certain utility function 푢(푐) the utility sum of many consumption paths
will be plus or minus infinity. Solely applying the scalars obtained by (2) wel-
fare of all these paths is not comparable. But it is straightforward to extend the
ranking of consumption paths by using overtaking or catching up criteria. Thus,
e.g., a consumption path (푐푎1, 푐푎2, . . . ) is strictly preferred to a consumption path
(푐푏1, 푐
푏
2, . . . ) if there is a period 푇˜ such that for all 푇 > 푇˜ the inequality
푇∑
푡=1
푢(푐푎푡 ) >
푇∑
푡=1
푢(푐푏푡) (3)
holds. Weak preference is obtained if condition (3) is fulfilled with weak inequal-
ity ≥. For fundamental reasons it is, however, not possible to make a further
extension of the partial ordering given by (3) which respects stronger versions of
the Pareto principle and would allow us to make a comparison between any two
consumption paths.
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(ii) While in a productive economy maximin is too much in favor of the present
undiscounted utilitarianism may be too much in favor of the future demanding
excessively high savings from earlier generations. For an illustration assume that,
given a strictly increasing utility function and starting from a constant consump-
tion path (푐, 푐, . . . ), the consumption sacrifice 푠 in the first generation allows any
subsequent generation to increase its consumption by some 휖 > 0. Then, as long
as 푢(푐 − 푠) > −∞, the consumption path (푐 − 푠, 푐 + 휖, 푐 + 휖, . . . ) will dominate
(푐, 푐, . . . ) according to the criterion (3) irrespective of how small 휖 is. This well-
known argument against undiscounted utilitarianism (see already Chakravarty,
S. (1969) , Rawls, J. (1971), Arrow (1999) and Asheim, G. (2010)), however,
needs some qualification as it does not hold for any path from which saving
starts. Suppose that the utility function is 푢(푐) = −푐−1. Let the initial consump-
tion path be (1, 2, 4, 8, . . . ) which then has aggregate welfare −2. Now assume
that generation 1 saves 1
4
which increases consumption of any subsequent gen-
eration by the uniform amount 1
10
. Welfare along the new consumption stream(
3
4
, 2 + 1
10
, 4 + 1
10
, 8 + 1
10
, . . .
)
=
(
3
4
, 21
10
, 41
10
, 81
10
, . . .
)
is smaller than along the path(
3
4
, 21
20
⋅ 2, 21
20
⋅ 4, 21
20
⋅ 8, . . . ) whose welfare is −4
3
− 20
21
⋅ 1 = −48
21
< −2. So the new
path is inferior to the original one. This means that the investment of generation 1
does not improve welfare even though all generations from generation 2 on ben-
efit from an equal increase of consumption. If saving of generation 1 exceeded
1
2
then any increase in future consumption along the given initial path would
not be sufficient to restore welfare to its original level. Therefore, if we do not
start from a constant, but from a strictly monotone increasing consumption path
undiscounted utilitarianism may well be able to prevent excessive saving and
the concomitant overburdening of earlier generations. Restricting the speed of
growth to an ethically acceptable degree to protect the interests of earlier genera-
tion is not a priori excluded in the framework of undiscounted utilitarianism (see
Asheim, G. and Buchholz, W. (2003) for a further elaboration of this argument).
D. Discounted Utilitarianism
Most frequently intertemporal evaluation is performed using discounted utili-
tarian social welfare functions which give utility of future generations less weight
than utility of earlier ones. This type of social welfare functions is defined by
푊 (푐1, 푐2, . . . ) =
∞∑
푡=1
훿푡푢(푐푡) (4)
. In (4) the function 푢(푐푡) again represents utility of consumption and (훿푡)푡=1,2,...
is a non-increasing sequence of utility discount factors with
∑∞
푡=1 훿푡 < ∞. These
utility discount factors indicate how much utility in period 푡 counts in terms of
period 1. Therefore, 훿1 = 1 and, if 훿푡 = 1 for all 푡 = 1, 2, . . . , undiscounted utili-
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tarianism is obtained as a special case of (4). Traditionally, (훿푡)푡=1,2,... is assumed
to fall geometrically, i.e. 훿푡 = 훿푡−1 where 훿 = 11−휌 and 휌 ≥ 0 is the constant dis-
count or time preference rate3. Discounted utilitarianism has several desirable
properties.
(i) For consumption paths that are strictly bounded away from zero and bounded
above social welfare according to (4) is a well-defined scalar such that a complete
ordering is obtained. Completeness is an attractive feature if one shares the view
that a rational ethical observer should always be able to decide whether one of
two arbitrarily given consumption paths is better than the other (or whether they
are equivalent). But it may be questioned how important completeness really
is, i.e. whether "incompleteness (is) such a defect of an ethical theory" (Roemer
J. (2011), p. 370). So if the task is to choose a best element out of a class of
technically feasible consumption paths one may be content with finding paths
that dominate all other paths for a solely partial ordering, as e.g. the overtak-
ing criterion as conceived by v. Weizsäcker, C. C. (1965) as a specific version
of undiscounted utilitarianism. Reducing demands and becoming more modest
in this way also reflects the view that it normally is quite unlikely that a single
criterion integrates all properties that are normatively desirable. This problem
is especially important when there are infinitely many agents/generations such
that - since Diamond, P. (1965) - impossibility results abound in the literature on
intertemporal evaluation4. In particular, it has been shown that a social order-
ing which fulfils the equal treatment postulate and the strong Pareto principle is
not representable by a cardinal social welfare function when there is an infinite
number of generations (see Basu, K. and Mitra, T. (2003)). Nevertheless, having
a numerical welfare measurement makes the determination of optimal consump-
tion paths simpler and more transparent, which - from a purely technical view-
point - is a non-negligible advantage of discounted utilitarianism. But properly
understood this argument cannot claim much ethical significance.
(ii) Applying a discounted utilitarian criterion is held to be an appropriate safe-
guard to avoid excessive savings of earlier generations. This is particularly clear
if, as in the example of the previous section, we start from a constant consump-
tion path and any generation 푡 = 2, 3, . . . has an equal increase in consumption 휖.
Then given
∑∞
푡=1 훿푡 <∞, the level of a welfare-improving investment in period 1
naturally is restricted by 푠ˆ = (
∑∞
푡=1 훿푡) 휖 which protects generation 1. But, as ex-
plained above, along non-constant consumption paths the same effect may also
3We emphasize this point, because there is seemingly a remaining confusion of what is being
discounted with the discount rate or the discount factor.
4One property of social orderings which the literature concentrates on but whose ethical
meaning is hard to detect is continuity w.r.t different topologies. See e.g. Svensson, L.-G. (1980),
Asheim, G. and Buchholz, W. (2003) and Roemer J. (2011) for a discussion on this. Sakai, T.
(2010) instead focuses on the compatibility between anonymity, strong Pareto and transitivity
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be brought about with undiscounted social welfare functions. Moreover, if the
utility function and the time discount factors are fixed, discounted utilitarianism
mitigates but not necessarily avoids excessive savings of the first generation. We
will show this using a linear growth model where the capital stock 푘푡+1 that gen-
eration 푡 hands over to generation 푡 + 1 is given by 푘푡+1 = 훼(푘푡 − 푐푡). Here, 훼 is
a productivity parameter which is assumed to be constant over time and which
indicates the marginal rate of transformation between consumption in period 푡
and period 푡 + 1. If 푘푡 is the initially given capital endowment of generation 1
then all consumption paths (푐1, 푐2, . . . ) are technically feasible for which
∞∑
푡=1
푐푡
훼푡−1
≤ 푘1 (5)
holds. Just as before we start from a constant consumption path (푐, 푐, . . . ) and
assume that generation 1 makes an additional saving of 푠 units of consumption.
Then it directly follows from (5) that this enables any subsequent generation to
increase its consumption by (훼− 1)푠 units. If we now consider the special case of
an isoelastic utility function with 휂 = 1 , i.e. ln 푐, the sum of discounted utilities
flowing from some 푠 is
ln(푐− 푠) +
∞∑
푡=2
훿푡−1 ln(푐+ (훼− 1)푠) = ln(푐− 푠) + 훿
1− 훿 ln(푐+ (훼− 1)푠) (6)
By an easy calculation the level of savings which maximizes (6) is
푠∗ =
훿훼− 1
훼− 1 푐 (7)
For even not quite eccentric values of 훿 and 훼, as e.g. 훿 = 0.9 and 훼 = 1.25, (7)
implies that generation 1 would be forced to sacrifice 45 % of its initial consump-
tion to make future generations better off. If the productivity parameter 훼 goes to
infinity, the level of savings converges to 훿푐 which clearly shows that fixed social
preferences will not prevent overburdening of generation 1 in any case, i.e. inde-
pendent of the underlying technology. Concerning their ability to deal with the
danger of excessive saving, the difference between undiscounted and discounted
utilitarianism thus turns out to be less fundamental than might appear at first
sight.
(iii) The first order conditions along an optimal path in the linear growth model
of the previous section are
푢′(푐푡+1) =
1
훿훼
푢′(푐푡) (8)
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which for an isoelastic utility function means
푐푡+1 = (훿훼)
1
휂 푐푡. (9)
It follows from (9) that the same optimal path is obtained for different combina-
tions of 훿 and 휂. In particular, the optimal solution, which results for some origi-
nally given parameter values 훿 and 휂, can also be implemented without any pure
time discount, i.e. 훿 = 1 , by-choosing a different inequality aversion parameter 휂˜
which is
휂˜ =
휂 ln훼
ln훼 + ln 훿
. (10)
This interchangeability of 훿 and 훼 that, when choices among consumption paths
are at stake, the gap between undiscounted and discounted utilitarianism is less
deep than usually suspected.
The ethically questionable properties of discounted utilitarianism which more
or less mirror the advantages of undiscounted utilitarianism will now be dis-
cussed.
(i) Discounted utilitarian social welfare functions do not treat all generations
equally as utility of later generations counts less than utility of earlier ones. Thus
these criteria violate the basic postulate of intergenerational equity which nor-
mally is taken for granted when there only is a finite number of agents.
(ii) It is not excluded that discounted utilitarianism may lead to a non-sustainable
development: Along consumption paths that maximize discounted utilitarian
welfare (4) consumption of later generations may be smaller than that of earlier
ones and, moreover, consumption may go to zero in the long run (see Dasgupta,
P. and Heal, G. (1979), p.299). This phenomenon in general occurs if productiv-
ity of capital is low as compared to the discount rates. So it immediately follows
from (8) that in the linear growth model consumption along an optimal is falling
and converges to 0 if 훿훼 < 1 . Declining consumption is inevitable for any con-
stant discount factor 훿 < 1 if, as in the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow model with an ex-
haustible resource, marginal productivity of man-made capital converges to zero
while the utility discount rate 휌 is constant over time. Therefore, discounted util-
itarianism not only is unfair towards later generations in the light of its assump-
tion but also w.r.t. its possible consequences for the distribution of consumption
across generations.
(iii) Discounted utilitarianism may violate the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle.
This happens if the transfer goes from a rich early generation 푡1 to a poor later
generation 푡2 whenever 훿푡1푢′(푐푡1) > 훿푡2푢′(푐푡2). This condition is fulfilled if
푐푡2
푐푡1
is
close to one but 훿푡2
훿푡1
is rather small.
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E. Hybrid Criteria
In the recent literature on intertemporal evaluation a lot of suggestions for
new criteria have been made to overcome some of the deficiencies of the standard
criteria. The conceptually simplest approach is to combine two criteria in order to
preserve some of the advantages of both. Modifying an approach of Chichilnisky,
G. (1996), ? have suggested some composition of discounted utilitarianism with
the maximin rule such that
푊 (푐1, 푐2, . . . ) = (1−Θ)
∞∑
푡=1
훿푡푢(푐푡) + Θ inf
푡=1,2,...
푢(푐푡) (11)
emerges as mixed Bentham-Rawls welfare function. Here, the right-hand side of
the equation is referring here to utilities and the parameter Θ indicates the rela-
tive weight which the maximin has in the aggregate criterion. Applying a wel-
fare function of this type gives a complete ranking of consumption streams and,
above all, makes less likely that early generations enjoy a large increase in their
well-being but the great many of future generations are driven into poverty. Thus
a major possible shortcoming of discounted utilitarianism can be avoided and
more equitable balance of interest between the present and the future is achieved.
But a sustainable development is not ensured in any case just if the parameter Θ
is very small (see ?), and the strong Pareto criterion is only fulfilled if the utility
function 푢(푐) is bounded below. This, however, is not an innocuous assumption
since in most empirical applications isoelastic utility functions 푢(푐) with inequal-
ity aversion 휂 ≥ 1 and thus lim푐→0 푢(푐) = −∞ are used (see also the subsequent
Section 3 for a justification of this). Moreover, if 훿 < 1, the social welfare function
does not imply equal treatment of all generation such that anonymity as the basic
postulate of intergenerational equity is also violated with mixed Bentham-Rawls
criteria.
In contrast to that Zuber, S. and G. Asheim (2010) have devised a new cri-
terion which combines anonymity with discounting. The idea underlying this
approach is that discounting does not depend on the period of time in which
some level of consumption accrues but on the rank which the consumption level
of a generation has in the whole consumption path. A problem with this rank-
discounted utilitarianism is that, given an infinite number of generations, a rank-
ing of consumption levels does not exist for all consumption streams, e.g. for
any strictly decreasing path, such that additional constructions are required to
extend and complete the social ordering, and strong Pareto. Nevertheless, rank-
discounted utilitarianism gives later generations much more protection against
rapacity of the earlier ones than the mixed Bentham-Rawls welfare functions
which, from the perspective of sustainability, constitutes an important advan-
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tage. With the Asheim-Zuber criterion serves as an "added expression of aver-
sion to inequality" (Asheim, G. (2011), p. 8). But some further discussion seems
to be advisable why rank-discounted utilitarianism should in this respect be con-
sidered superior to undiscounted utilitarianism.
Rejecting the utilitarian framework at all Llavador, H., Silvestre, J. and J. Roe-
mer (2008) have devised a new type of criteria in which an exogenously given
constant growth rate 푔 of well-being is the objective that optimal paths have to
fulfill. Proceeding in this unconventional way the maximin rule (where 푔 = 0) is
generalized to a sustainable growth criterion which allows for economic progress
and which thus cures the major defect of pure maximin. The question, however,
is through which normative concepts the choice of some growth target 푔 may
be motivated. Moreover, in some technological environments as the standard
Dasgupta-Heal-Solow model, consumption growth with any constant positive
rate is not possible which somewhat reduces the applicability of the Llavador-
Silvestre-Roemer criterion.
F. Some Preliminary Assessment
All intertemporal social welfare functions that we have discussed have their
pros and cons. Since maximin - with its exclusion of investment and economic
progress - mostly deserves attention for fixing basic ideas the real choice is be-
tween undiscounted and discounted utilitarianism. Which of these criteria is to
be preferred thus is the major field of controversy in the scientific debate. Un-
til now we have only compared these two types of evaluation criteria at an ab-
stract level without saying anything about the parameter values that are needed
to specify them. In particular, a decision on the appropriate level of the degree of
inequality aversion 휂 incorporated in the isoelastic utility function 푢(푐) and the
discount rate 휌 are required to make the criteria applicable.
In simulation studies on climate change policy (as e.g. in Nordhaus’ DICE-
model) 휂 and 훿 are, in the tradition of the descriptive school, normally deter-
mined by calibrating numerical growth models such that the Ramsey equation
푟 = 휂푔+훿 (see e.g. Dasgupta, P. and Heal, G. (1979) or Stern, N. (2006)) is fulfilled
for the empirically observed consumption growth rate 푔 and the real interest rate
푟. Proceeding this way (?, p. 692) finds "the ethical reasoning on discount rates
(. . . ) largely irrelevant for the actual investments and negotiations about climate
change". But from the viewpoint of the prescriptive school adopted here the pa-
rameter choice should also be made on the basis of normative principles. What at
least is required "is adjusting certain parameters so as to reach a conclusion more
in line wit our intuitive judgments" (Rawls, J. (1971), p. 298).The possibility to
determine these parameters by ethical reflections may also have some repercus-
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sions for the acceptability of the criteria as such. These additional, and in contrast
to the topics treated until now, less familiar ethical issues will now be discussed.
III. CHOICE OF PARAMETERS FROM A NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVE
The degree of inequality aversion of the utility function plays a role for the
specification of undiscounted, discounted and the hybrid criteria discussed above.
The pattern of the time discount rate is only important for discounted utilitarian-
ism and the hybrid versions. In the case of the mixed Bentham-Rawls criteria the
weighing factor for the maximin part would have to be determined in addition.
A. Inequality Aversion
The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (see Stern, N. (2006)),
in contrast to much previous work on climate change, explicitly addressed the
ethical dimension of intergenerational evaluation which in particular meant that
it in principle adopted the equal treatment postulate for generations deeply rooted
in the prescriptive school. Therefore, in Stern’s approach the elasticity of marginal
utility 휂 automatically became the main tool for bringing about an ethically ac-
ceptable balance of interest between different generations. But, somewhat sur-
prisingly, the highly crucial choice of 휂 was not discussed explicitly from the
ethical viewpoint. In this context the reflections remained rather scanty, and no
convincing normative justification for specifically choosing as inequality aversion
index in the main part of the empirical study was given. At the central place of
the Report (see Stern, N. (2006), p. 184) there is only a short remark that em-
ploying 휂 = 1 is "in line with recent empirical estimates". Reference, however,
only is made to two empirical papers by Stern, N. (1977) and Pearce, D. and D.
Ulph (1995), and it is not explained why such empirical estimates might at all be
of much value for making ethical decisions. So coming to the choice of 휂 , Stern,
N. (2006) does not contribute very much and, to some degree, even neglects his
ethical intentions. The discussion after Stern, N. (2006), however, has shown that
ethically relevant arguments on the choice of 휂 can be found in three different
ways.
(i) Adopting an ethical perspective does not exclude that the ethical values of ex-
isting people become the standard of evaluation. Then the debate is not about
what seems to be just in the eyes of an impartial and detached ethical observer
but which altruistic attitudes are prevalent in a society. This approach, on which
- without any further explanation and assessment - Stern, N. (2006) draws on,
combines prescriptive and descriptive elements but observed data do not come
from the market-place but from political decisions where ethical motivations on
distributional issues manifest. Although many political decisions (e.g. on pen-
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sion reform and the size of the government deficit) clearly affect distribution be-
tween generations, it is very difficult, if not impossible to find out the level of
underlying inequality aversion 휂. Therefore, results on individual preferences for
redistribution that are obtained from empirical studies on the income tax system
are transferred to the field of intergenerational distribution. The various studies
on inequality aversion as expressed by income tax progressivity give quite differ-
ent values for 휂 which in some studies lies in the interval be-tween 1 and 2 (see
Evans, D. (2005)) but is lower in other studies (see Atkinson, A. and Brandolini,
A. (2010)). These data certainly give some hint at existing normative beliefs on
inequality. But the attitudes towards income distribution within a society are
multi-dimensional and include aspects of effort and merit which are absent in the
intergenerational context (where instead motivations as responsibility and stew-
ardship play some role). So it may be doubted whether the estimates for that have
been obtained from income tax studies can easily be applied to intergenerational
evaluation and climate policy.
(ii)The ethical acceptability of different values of 휂 can also be assessed by con-
ducting "thought experiments" through which their implications in specific the-
oretical models are described and, in the end, some "reflective equilibrium" (see
at a general level Rawls, J. (1971) and with specific application to intergenera-
tional equity Asheim, G. (2010)) on distributional norms might be achieved. In
this vein Dasgupta, P. (2008) has examined which consequences the choice of 휂
as suggested by Stern, N. (2006) has for the speed of optimal growth in a linear
Ramsey growth model. Under otherwise plausible assumptions the essentially
well-known result was that 휂 = 1 would lead to an extremely high savings rate
along optimal growth paths amounting to almost 100 %. Then a fair balance of
intergenerational distribution would not be attained since the early generations
suffers very much from the consumption sacrifices that are imposed on them to
make the future better off. In this way the traditional oversaving argument that
usually is applied to disprove undiscounted utilitarianism is brought into play
to make judgments about sensible values of 휂. Following this approach instead
of 휂 = 1 higher levels of 휂 (e.g. 휂 = 2 as proposed by Dasgupta, P. (2008) and
other authors like Weitzman, M. (2007)) are warranted, which lead to more equal
optimal consumption paths and protect earlier generations from overburdening
through excessive saving.
(iii) It is also possible to start from some explicitly formulated postulates (or "ax-
ioms") which a social welfare function should fulfill. Such a property is "circum-
stance solidarity" (Fleurbaey, M. (2008)) which in the context of growth theory
means that no generation should lose in an optimal allocation when the techno-
logical conditions improve, i.e. in a linear growth model the productivity param-
eters are increased. If this condition is to be satisfied all values 휂 < 1 are excluded
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(see Buchholz, W. and Schumacher, J. (2010)). Therefore, 휂 = 1 as predominantly
used in Stern, N. (2006), turns out to be the minimum degree of inequality aver-
sion, which seems to be acceptable if circumstance solidarity is adopted as a nor-
mative postulate. In the framework of such an axiomatic approach one can add
other ethical postulates, as e.g. non-envy criteria which are also familiar in ethical
social choice theory. With this approach 휂 = 1 results when the non-envy condi-
tion refers to the absolute consumption levels of different generations. Alterna-
tively, we get 휂 = 2 when non-envy comparison between generations refers to
relative consumption levels (for details see again Buchholz, W. and Schumacher,
J. (2010)).
Different values of 휂 reflect value judgments, either at the level of voters or
at the level of an ethical observer. These value judgments unavoidably have a
subjective element so that it is clear from the very beginning that one cannot ex-
pect to obtain a unique and uncontroversial estimate for 휂. In spite of this general
caveat, several theoretical exercises as conducted above support the view that
low inequality aversion with values 휂 < 1 will not conform to ethical intuition.
Recent empirical observations on revealed ethical preference in tax policy are not
in contrast to this lower bound as most of them suggest values for 휂 somewhere
between 1 and 2. Therefore, we can conclude that from an ethical perspective
Stern, N. (2006) works with an extremely low degree of inequality aversion thus
implicitly giving the future (too) much weight.
Concerning an upper bound for 휂 , things are less clear. No one in the debate
seems to advocate a value of 휂 much higher than 3. But these proposals mostly
follow from pure guesswork such that additional research which aims at finding
more precise foundations for such choices seems to be required.
B. Time Preference
Determination of pure utility time discount factors (훿푡)푡=1,2,... is still less straight-
forward than of inequality aversion 휂. There are three approaches which - similar
as in the case of 휂 - either refer to stated preferences of individuals or to normative
ideas of an ethical observer.
(i) Aggregating opinions of more than 2000 economists Weitzman, M. (2001) ob-
tained discount rates not being constant but falling to zero over time. Specifically,
he got a discount rate of 4 % for the next 5 years as the "immediate future", then 3
% until year 25 from now, 2 % between year 26 and 75, 1 % between year 76 and
300 and thereafter for the "far-distant future" the discount rate is 0. But as Weitz-
man’s study had the character of a black box and the motives of the respondents
have not been explored systematically, it is not clear what the elicited discount
rates really express. In particular, it is left open whether the answers reflect pure
time preference as such or whether the results are confounded by other aspects
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as inequality aversion or predictions of future growth rates. These difficulties,
which occur if one tries to isolate pure time preference as a behavioral motive,
are well-known from the empirical literature on discounting as a determinant of
individual choices in every-day life. Controlling for these additional factors nor-
mally leads to discount rates that are substantially lower than those originally
suspected (see Frederick, S., Loewenstein, G. and O´Donoghue, T. (2002)). An-
other difficulty with Weitzman’s approach is related to the specific method he
uses to aggregate the elicited time discount rates. For an illustration of this prob-
lem we consider a simple example, in which there are two respondents 푎 and 푏.
Agent 푎 has the constant time preference rate 휌푎 = 0 such that for the time dis-
count factors of this agent 훿푎푡 = 1 holds for all periods 푡 = 1, 2, . . . . Agent 푏 instead
has the time preference rate 휌푏 = 1 such that 훿푏푡 =
(
1
2
)푡−1 in period 푡. Taking the
average of these both discount factors gives
훿푚푡 =
1
2
⋅ 1 + 1
2
⋅
(
1
2
)푡−1
(12)
as discount factor for period 푡 = 1, 2, . . . . Clearly, lim푡→∞ 훿푚푡 = 1 which means
that the discount rates obtained by this averaging procedure must converge to
0 in the long run. The same result holds when there are not different opinions
on time preference but when discount rates are uncertain (Weitzman, M. (1998)).
This theoretical exercise shows that Weitzman’s main result, i.e. that costs and
benefits should be discounted at the lowest possible rate, does not so much rest
upon the collected opinions on the discount rate but rather is a direct consequence
of his aggregation method which is not at all naturally given. So, alternatively,
one could simply average the different stated discount rates, which based on
Weitzman’s data would give the constant discount rate of about 4 % , or con-
sider - as suggested by Gollier, C. (2004) - the average value of future instead
of present values, which would change the outcome totally. Then the far-distant
future would have to be discounted at the highest possible rate. In any case it
is required that the ideas, and possibly their normative content, lying behind the
aggregation method is explained and motivated carefully. Otherwise, the proce-
dure remains ad hoc and its results only have restricted value.
(ii) Assume that the ethical observer is behind a veil of uncertainty and then ap-
plies expected utility theory. If the different states of the world will not occur with
the same probability she will take these differences into account when she makes
her assessment - even if, in principle, she is impartial and does not favor any po-
sition. In the intergenerational context this argument implies that it is ethically
well acceptable to give later generations some lower weight in social evaluation
since there is some risk that mankind (e.g. by an asteroid or by a devastating epi-
demic disease) may be extinct and thus later generations that can enjoy the fruits
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of savings today do not exist. If this risk of extinction from one period to the next
is assumed to be constant over time and equal to 휋 the discount factor in period 푡
is equal to the probability of survival 훿푡 = (1− 휋)푡−1. Estimation of clearly is very
speculative and a matter of subjective belief. In particular, Stern, N. (2006) has
assumed a probability of 10 % that civilization may be extinct within one century
which implies an annual utility discount rate 휌 = 0.1$ . From the ethical stand-
point it may also seem questionable to make such a bet on the existence of future
generations.
(iii) If we return to the linear growth model and especially to equation (x) it be-
comes clear that non-decreasing and thus sustainable consumption paths emerge
as optimal solutions if 훿훼 > 1 , i.e. 훿 > 1
훼
or 휌 < 훼 − 1, which means that the
time discount rate must be lower than the economy’s net productivity. Growth of
consumption along an optimal path becomes slower if inequality aversion 휂 is in-
creased. If 훿 = 1
훼
or 휌 = 훼− 1 a constant consumption path is obtained. With this
approach the time discount rates which are considered as appropriate vary with
the underlying technology and thus become endogenous. The ethical primitive
then is some desirable speed of growth which is well in line with Rawls, J. (1971)
"just savings principle" and his justification of pure time discount. A problem
with this approach, however, is that the familiar idea that time discount rates are
part of fixed social preferences, which exist independent of the technological con-
ditions, has to be abandoned. But at least some upper bound for the admissible
discount rate is found by which a non-sustainable development can be avoided.
IV. CONCLUSION
If the choice of a specific intertemporal evaluation criterion is seen to be an
ethical one, which is the viewpoint adopted in this article, an undisputable solu-
tion clearly does not exist. Following M. Weber’s famous "Wertfreiheitspostulat"
it can never be decided objectively and on a scientific base what should be con-
sidered as an equitable distribution e.g. among generations. Nevertheless, our
considerations allow some tentative conclusions.
(i) Concerning the decision between undiscounted and discounted utilitarian-
ism turning down the undiscounted version as often postulated in the literature
neither seems to be appropriate nor necessary. On the one hand, undiscounted
utilitarianism implies equal treatment of all generations and ensures sustainabil-
ity, which are attractive properties of evaluation criteria. On the other hand, it
does not seriously restrict the possibility to make choices among increasing con-
sumption paths such that, in particular, the introduction of pure time discount
is not really required to avoid the problem of excessive saving which usually is
attributed to undiscounted utilitarianism and is seen as one of its major shortcom-
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ings. To endorse equal treatment of generations and thus undiscounted utilitari-
anism at the fundamental level does, moreover, not preclude that some, possibly
extremely small pure time discount rate is applied through which the uncertainty
of future costs and benefits is taken into account. Irrespective of the chosen level
of the time discount rate such a kind of "discounted utilitarianism light" in par-
ticular gives numerical representability of the underlying social ordering what,
on the one hand, faciliates application to empirical cost-benefit analysis. On the
other hand, it ensures completeness of the social ordering and fulfillment of the
strong Pareto principle such that the extensive theoretical discussion on impos-
sibility results in the infinity case becomes a little redundant. Seen from such a
pragmatic perspective also some doubts may arise whether the more complicated
hybrid criteria really make an improvement. So, partly for the same and partly
for additional reasons as drawn on by Stern, N. (2006), we are essentially back-
ing Stern’s approach to intertemporal evaluation which, at a general level, might
represent shift of paradigm in intertemporal evaluation.
(ii) Concerning the parameters that specify the social welfare function we also
accept Stern’s choice of a very low pure time discount rate 휌 but reject his choice
of the inequality aversion parameter 휂 as too low. Various thought experiments
conducted in growth theoretic models as well as empirical observations of actual
political decisions on redistribution suggest values of 휂 that are higher than 1 and
mostly lie closer to 2 than to 1. By now, unfortunately, no clear-cut normative cri-
teria seem to be available which might help to determine more precise value for
휂. Thus there is much room left for the choice of 휂 , such that in specific applica-
tions robustness tests with different values of 휂 are advisable. But, as a practical
consequence, employing some higher level of 휂 gives less weight to the future
which, in the context of climate policy, means that the abatement of greenhouse
gas emissions could happen more slowly than suggested by Stern, N. (2006).
Then, working with more sensible values of 휂, would take much edge off the
partly very heated debate on the Stern Report and its urgent demand for strong
and immediate action in climate change policy. In a certain way, this confirms
a basic message of this paper: The question of principle whether to use undis-
counted or discounted utilitarianism is to some degree futile concerning practical
policy implications. What in the end matters much more is the selection of spe-
cific parameter values for which some well-founded ethical judgment, however,
is often hard to provide.
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